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 Over a little more than the last twenty years Poland has undergone a fundamental  
socio-economic change. That period brought about a shift from a socialist economy to a free  
market model and Poland was eventually accepted as a member of the European Union.  
An important element of the reforms was the building of the competition law system, which  
was an unprecedented operation on a global scale. It should be underlined that the structure  
of the Polish economy was shaped by almost half a century of ideological monopolization  
and central planning, which made the introduction of competition law to the economical system  
a complicated task.  
 The first part of this paper contains a description of the evolution of Polish competition law. 
Such considerations are a starting point for an analysis concerning the place of competition law  
in the Polish legal system and its comparison with the European standards. Further points of this 
article present both an examination of the influence of the EU competition law on the Polish case 
law as well as an analysis of the areas in which there is a need for further approximation  
of the Polish competition law to the European Union standards. Finally, general conclusions 
concerning the influence of the EU competition law on the Polish legal system are formulated.  
 The author makes an attempt to identify the causes of the differences existing between these 
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I.  AN OUTLINE OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLISH COMPETITION LAW 
 
 The beginnings of the Polish competition law date back to the interwar 
period1. Its development was interrupted by the introduction of the system 
of a centrally planned socialist economy, whose basic principles remain  
in contradiction with the axiology of competition law.  
 In the 1970s and 1980s it became clear that socialist economy  
was inefficient. Some theorists underlined the fact that the monopolized 
areas of capitalistic economy revealed dangers very similar to those 
presented by a centrally planned socialist economy. They postulated  
the incorporation of some elements of competition law into the Polish 
socialist law. The titles of articles published in those days in the leading 
Polish law journals are characteristic of this phenomenon. S. Sołtysiński 
wrote “about the need for law against monopolistic practices and unfair 
competition”2. J. Trojanek published an article “on the need and ways  
to break through monopolistic practices in a socialized economy”3.  
 European and United States patterns played an vital role  
in the development of the discussion on the building of Polish competition 
law. For example, I. Wiszniewska and A. Kawecki, in 1982, describing  
the basic principles of the drafted Polish competition law, strongly referred 
to the EC competition law4.  
 The conflict existing between the socialist economy and competition 
law was so intense that any attempt to combine them was doomed  
to be fruitless. Thus, it is hardly surprising that until the end of the socialist 
period, competition law in Poland existed only in a very fragmentary 
                                                     
1 See Act of 28.03.1933 on cartels, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 1933, No. 31, item 270. 
2 S. Sołtysiński, O potrzebie ustawodawstwa zwalczającego praktyki monopolistyczne i nieuczciwą 
konkurencji [About the Necessity of the Law Against Monopolistic Practicies and Unfair 
Competition], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1982, no. 12, p. 16. 
3 J. Trojanek, O potrzebie i ekonomiczno-prawnych sposobach przełamywania monopolistycznych 
praktyk w gospodarce uspołecznionej [About the Necessity and Economic-Legal Ways of Breaking 
Through Monopolistic Practices in a Socialised Economy], Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny  
i Społeczny [Legal, Economic and Sociological Movement] 1973, no. 3, p. 49. 
4 See I. Wiszniewska, A. Kawecki, Problem legislacji antymonopolowej w systemie zreformowanej 
gospodarki [Legislative Problems of Antitrust Law in the System of a Reformed Economy], Przegląd 
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego [Economic Law Review] 1982, no. 12, p. 262. 
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form5. Nonetheless, it should be underlined that the debate which took 
place in Poland mainly in the 1980s, inspired among other things  
by the EC competition law, was pivotal to the further development  
of Polish competition law. 
 The idea that the introduction of competition law should be an intrinsic 
element of Polish socio-economical transformation was widely accepted  
at the end of the 1980s. It was also obvious that Polish competition law 
should be similar to the EC competition law. 
 On the 24th February 1990 an Act against monopolistic practices  
was passed6. In his attempt to compare the law with the European 
standards, T. Skoczny concludes that it was in the mainstream of European 
antitrust laws7. Notwithstanding, the author stresses that the law of 1990 
needed various corrections and adjustments8.  
 The passing of the Act of 15th December 2000 on competition  
and consumer protection9 is considered to be a turning point  
in the development of the Polish competition law10. In C. Banasiński’s point 
of view, its main purpose was to adjust Polish law to EC standards11.  
The law of 2000 was replaced by a new one, now in force, the Act  
of 16th February 2007 on competition and consumer protection12. Its core  
is composed of Articles 6 and 9, which are very similar to Articles 101  
                                                     
5 Ustawa z dnia 28.01.1987 o przeciwdziałaniu praktykom monopolistycznym  
w gospodarce narodowej, Dz.U. Nr 3, poz. 18 ze zm. [Act of 28.01.1987 about counteracting 
monopolistic practices in national economy, Journal of Laws of 1987, No. 3, item 18  
with amendments]. 
6 Ustawa z dnia 24.02.1990 o przeciwdziałaniu praktykom monopolistycznym i ochronie 
interesów konsumentów, Dz.U. 1990, Nr 14, poz. 88 ze zm. [Act of 24.02.1990 about 
counteracting monopolistic practices and protection of consumers, Journal of Laws of 1990, 
No. 14, item 88 with amendments]. 
7 See T. Skoczny, Ustawy antymonopolowe krajów postsocjalistycznych [Antitrust Laws of Former 
Communist Countries], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego [Economic Law Review] 
1992, no. 7-8, p. 132. 
8 Ibidem, p. 132. 
9 Consolidated text – Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2005, No. 244, item 2080 with amendments. 
10 See C. Banasiński, Ewolucja ustawodawstwa antymonopolowego w Polsce [Evolution of Polish 
Antitrust Law], [in:] C. Banasiński (ed.), Ochrona konkurencji i konsumentów w Polsce i Unii 
Europejskiej [Protection of Competition and Consumers in Poland and in the European Union], 
Warszawa: Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów 2005, p. 17.  
11 Ibidem, p. 23. 
12 Ustawa z dnia 16.02.2007 o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Dz. U. 2007, Nr 50,  
poz. 331 ze zm. [Act of 16.02.2007 on competition and consumer protection, Journal of Laws 
of 2007, No. 50, item 331 with amendments]. 
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and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)13. 
According to Article 6(1) of the Polish Act on competition and consumer 
protection, agreements which have as their object or effect the elimination, 
restriction, or any other infringement of competition in the relevant market 
shall be prohibited, in particular those consisting in:  
 fixing, directly or indirectly, prices and other trading conditions, 
 limiting or controlling production or sale as well as technical 
development or investments, 
 sharing markets of sale or purchase, 
 applying to equivalent transactions with third parties onerous  
or not homogenous agreement terms and conditions, thus creating 
for these parties diversified conditions of competition, 
 making conclusion of an agreement subject to acceptance  
or fulfilment by the other party of another performance, having 
neither substantial nor customary relation with the subject  
of such agreement, 
 limiting access to the market or eliminating from the market 
undertakings which are not parties to the agreement, 
 collusion between undertakings entering a tender, or by those 
undertakings and the undertaking being the tender organiser,  
of the terms and conditions of bids to be proposed, particularly  
as regards the scope of works and the price. 
 This regulation almost literally repeats some parts of Article 101  
of the TFEU, which provides that the following shall be prohibited  
as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which  
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion  
of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
 directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions, 
 limit or control production, markets, technical development,  
or investment, 
                                                     
13 Consolidated version – OJ C 2012 326/47. 
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 share markets or sources of supply, 
 apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with  
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage, 
 make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature  
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with  
the subject of such contracts. 
 Under Article 9(1) of the Polish Act on competition and consumer 
protection the abuse of a dominant position in the relevant market  
by one or more undertakings shall be prohibited. According to Article 9(2) 
the abuse of a dominant position may, in particular, consist in:  
 direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices, including predatory 
prices or prices glaringly low, delayed payment terms or other 
trading conditions, 
 limiting production, sale or technological progress to the prejudice 
of contracting parties or consumers, 
 application to equivalent transactions with third parties of onerous 
or not homogenous agreement terms and conditions, thus creating 
for these parties diversified conditions of competition, 
 making conclusion of an agreement subject to acceptance  
or fulfilment by the other party of another performance having 
neither substantial nor customary relation with the subject  
of agreement, 
 counteracting formation of conditions necessary for the emergence 
or development of competition, 
 imposition by the undertaking of onerous agreement terms  
and conditions, yielding to this undertaking unjustified profits, 
 market sharing according to territorial, product, or entity-related 
criteria. 
 This is a very similar to Article 102 of the TFEU, which provides  
that any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited  
as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
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 directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices  
or other unfair trading conditions, 
 limiting production, markets or technical development  
to the prejudice of consumers, 
 applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage, 
 making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance  
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection  
with the subject of such contracts. 
 The similarity between the national and the EU competition law  
is not only specific for the Polish legal system. K.J. Cseres, M.P. Schinkel, 
F.O. Vogelaar have noticed that “many EU Member States in fact 
abandoned their ineffective competition regulation (…) and adopted 
competition law system similar to the rules presently laid down”14  
in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and in the EU merger regulation. 
  
II.  THE PLACE OF THE POLISH COMPETITION LAW IN THE SYSTEM  
OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN THE LIGHT OF EUROPEAN STANDARDS 
 
 After the communist years, the Polish legislator and courts faced  
the task of creating a coherent system for the protection of fundamental 
rights. One part of the effort was the establishment of the place  
of competition law in the general legal system. There was also a need  
for defining the relationship between competition rules and the rules  
of property protection, contractual freedom, and the freedom of economic 
activity. 
 European standards have been strongly influential upon  
the Polish constitutional rules concerning fundamental rights.  
The Polish constitutional rules connected with the problem of protection  
                                                     
14 K.J. Cseres, M.P. Schinkel, F.O. Vogelaar, Law and Economics of Criminal Antitrust 
Enforcement: An Introduction, [in:] K.J. Cseres, M.P. Schinkel, F.O. Vogelaar (eds), 
Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing 2006, 
p. 13.  
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of fundamental rights were mainly affected by the standards of the Council 
of Europe. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that according  
to Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union15, fundamental rights,  
as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection  
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from  
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law. 
 The framework of antitrust intervention can be found in Article 20  
of the Polish Constitution. It provides that a social market economy, based 
on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership as well  
as solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall  
be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Poland. It is worth 
emphasizing that the idea of a social market economy comes from  
the ordoliberal school. The presumption that competition law should 
occupy a crucial place in the modern legal system was a vital element  
of this ideological movement. It was justified by the statement  
“that a competitive economic system was necessary for a prosperous, free 
and equitable society”16. Moreover, as R. O’Donoghue, and A.J. Padilla 
point out, “many of key figures involved in the foundation of the European 
Community were associated with the ordoliberal school of thought. Some 
commentators have therefore argued that the abuse concept contained  
in Article 82 EC originates from a distinctly German doctrine of economic 
philosophy that had developed separately from the American notion  
of economic efficiency that underpinned the Sherman Act 1890”17. The idea 
of social market economy is still present in the discussions concerning  
the axiology of the EU competition law18. 
                                                     
15 Consolidated version – OJ C 2012 326/13. 
16 R. O’Donoghue, A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of article 82 EC, Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing 2006, p. 9. 
17 Ibidem, p. 9. See also W. Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World, New  
York 2002, pp.172-174; M.M. Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK, Oxford 2004, p. 6. 
18 See speech by Commissioner M. Monti, Competition in a Social Market Economy  
at the Conference of the European Parliament and the European Commission  
on Reform of European Competition Law in Freiburg on 9-10.11.2000, available online: 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/3556972/Competition-in-a-Social-Market-economy-Speech-
by-Commissioner-Monti. 
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 In the judgment of 9th September 2006 the Polish Supreme Court19 
expressed the idea that competition law limits the freedom to conduct  
a business. From that statement it can be inferred that the constitutional 
rules regulating acceptable limitations of fundamental rights are not 
irrelevant to the competition law point of view. Polish constitutional rules 
connected with such problems are strongly affected by European 
standards. It is clearly noticeable as regards the protection of property. 
Under Article 64(1) of the Polish Constitution everyone shall have  
the right to ownership, other property rights, and the right of succession. 
Article 64(2) provides that everyone, on an equal basis, shall receive legal 
protection regarding ownership, other property rights, and the right  
of succession. According to the Article 64(3) the right of ownership may  
be limited only by means of a statute and only to an extent that does not 
violate the substance of such right. Those regulations are in full accordance 
with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, under which every natural 
or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, 
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws  
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with  
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions 
or penalties. Similarly, Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union provides that everyone has the right to own, use, 
dispose of, and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one 
may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest  
and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject  
to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use  
of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general 
interest. 
                                                     
19 III SK 6/06, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego [Supreme Court Case Law] 2007, item 25. 
See also the judgment of 8.04.1998 of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Orzecznictwo 
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Zbiór Urzędowy [Constitutional Court Case Law – Official 
Record] 1998, no. 3, item 29.  
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 The problem of the interference of constitutional rights with the scope 
of freedom to conduct a business frequently emerges in the Polish case law. 
For example, it was the subject of the analysis of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal in the sentences of 18th June 200320.  
 The Polish case law seems to place more emphasis on the role  
of fundamental rights in competition law than the EU case law.  
The difference is mainly of rhetoric nature and is caused by historic factors.  
 After the communist years, the Polish legal system tended  
to focus upon the role of fundamental rights. It was essential for Polish 
courts to recognize the relationships between constitutional values  
and competition law in the emerging free market economy. It is worth 
noticing that similar tendencies were present in the US case law  
and theoretic discussions in the period of creating the basis of antitrust 
law21.  
 The situation looks different in the EU case law. For many years  
the integration in the EU system was mainly of an economic nature,  
so - naturally - the Court of Justice avoided analyses of the problem  
of the relations between fundamental rights and the EC competition  
law. After the Maastricht Treaty and the acceptance of the Charter  
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it became clear that 
fundamental rights are protected in the European Union system on a very 
similar level to that in the national constitutions and in the Council  
of Europe system22.  
 
III.  ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE POLISH CASE LAW AGAINST 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE EU STANDARDS 
 
 According to Article 3(2) of the Regulation 1/2003, the application  
of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of agreements, 
                                                     
20 K 2/02. 
21 See R.J. Peritz, Competition Policy in America, New York: Oxford University Press 2000,  
pp. 3, 9 et seq. 
22 See A. Szafrański, Wolność działalności gospodarczej w perspektywie prawa Unii Europejskiej 
[Freedom of Economic Activities from the European Union Law Point of View], [in:] W. Szwajdler, 
H. Nowicki (eds), Konstytucyjna zasada wolności gospodarczej [Constitutional Rule of Freedom  
of Economic Activities], Toruń: TNOiK 2009, pp. 423, 424.  
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decisions by associations of undertakings, or concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States, but which do not restrict 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty, or which 
fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty or which are covered  
by a Regulation for the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty. Member 
States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting  
and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit  
or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.  
 From the Article 3(2) it can be inferred that the Member States  
“are not precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter 
national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged  
in by undertakings”23. The Polish legislator has not taken that opportunity. 
Polish courts try to follow the Court of Justice way of thinking and avoid 
giving judgments contradictory to the European standards. It is especially 
well established that Polish law, including the Polish constitution, should 
be interpreted in accordance with t h e  s p i r i t  of the EU law. Among 
others, that rule was recognized by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal  
in the sentences of 12th June 200324, 21st April 200425, 11th May 200526  
and 17th July 200727. Nonetheless, Polish courts sometimes seem  
to be stricter in their examination of the prohibition of abusing a dominant 
position than is the EU case law. As an example, it is worth pointing  
out the problem of the duty to deal, which is sometimes associated with  
the essential facilities doctrine. 
 In the EU case law it is established that the duty to deal does not exist 
unless the cooperation is not essential from the weaker undertaker’s point 
of view and that there is no essentiality if the undertaker is able to fulfil 
their needs in another way.  
 Polish courts understand the notion of essentiality in a very broad way. 
In the judgment of 22nd June 1994 the Polish Antimonopoly Court28 decided 
that the duty to deal does not arise only when the alternative  
                                                     
23 O’Donoghue, Padilla, supra note 16, p. 49. 
24 K 2/02. 
25 K 33/03. 
26 K 18/04. 
27 P 16/06. 
28 XVII Ama 3/94, Wokanda 1995, no. 2. 
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possibility of fulfilling the key economic need is within one’s close reach.  
In the sentence of 12th June 2000 the Antimonopoly Court29 expressed  
the opinion that the notion of an alternative way of fulfilling supply needs 
does not include the possibility of fulfilling it by oneself for example  
by self-investment.  
 Those Polish judgments are not in line with the EU case law. Advocate 
General Jacobs, in an opinion delivered on 28th May 1998 in Oscar Bronner 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG and others30, expressed the opinion that in the EU legal system 
“intervention of that kind, whether understood as an application  
of the essential facilities doctrine or, more traditionally, as a response  
to a refusal to supply goods or services, can be justified in terms  
of competition policy only in cases in which the dominant undertaking  
has a genuine stranglehold on the related market. That might be the case 
for example where duplication of the facility is impossible or extremely 
difficult owing to physical, geographical or legal constraints or is highly 
undesirable for reasons of public policy. It is not sufficient that  
the undertaking’s control over a facility should give it a competitive 
advantage. I do not rule out the possibility that the cost of duplicating  
a facility might alone constitute an insuperable barrier to entry. That might 
be so particularly in cases in which the creation of the facility took place 
under non-competitive conditions, for example, partly through public 
funding. However, the test in my view must be an objective one: in other 
words, in order for refusal of access to amount to an abuse, it must  
be extremely difficult not merely for the undertaking demanding access, 
but for any other undertaking to compete. Thus, if the cost of duplicating 
the facility alone is the barrier to entry, it must be such as to deter  
any prudent undertaking from entering the market”31.  
 Generally speaking, the duty to deal in the Polish case law has  
a broader scope than it does in the EU case law. This is in line with  
the tendency of the courts of ex-socialist countries to be very strict  
                                                     
29 XVII Ama 93/99. 
30 Case C-7/97 [1999] ECR I-7791 (paragraph 65-66). 
31 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid= 
9ea7d2dc30dbc300b201e73b4b86873db2199df1720c.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuMa3z0?docla
ng=EN&text&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=43901&occ=first&dir&cid=27225. 
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in applying the prohibition of abusing a dominant position32. In that place 
it is worth stressing the specific character of the economy of ex-socialist 
countries, in which the dominant position is frequently occupied by former 
socialist monopolists. Their strong economic position is a consequence  
of the decisions of communist authorities and not the result of their 
efficiency and as such justifies a stricter attitude to it. That line of reasoning 
is not contradictory to the EU competition law standards. Nonetheless,  
it seems that the Polish case law concerning the duty to deal is even stricter 
than is justified by the specific character of the Polish economy.  
 
IV.  THE NEED FOR FURTHER APPROXIMATION OF THE POLISH 
COMPETITION LAW TO THE EUROPEAN STANDARDS 
 
 Generally speaking, Polish competition law fulfils requirements 
coming from EU law. Nonetheless, one can still find areas in which there  
is a tension between the two legal systems. It is especially worthwhile  
to mention the problem of damages for damage coming from the violation 
of the EU competition law.  
 The Member States are obliged to assure the possibility of getting 
damages for damage resulting from the violation of the EU competition 
law. The Court of Justice in Manfredi pointed out that “it should  
be recalled that the full effectiveness of Article 81 EC and, in particular,  
the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC would 
be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages  
for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict  
or distort competition (Courage and Crehan, cited above, paragraph 26).  
It follows that any individual can claim compensation for the harm 
suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and  
an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC.  In the absence  
of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal 
system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having 
jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing 
                                                     
32 See R. Janusz, T. Skoczny, Wprowadzenie [Introduction], [in:] Ustawy antymonopolowe krajów 
postsocjalistycznych [Antitrust Laws of Former Communist Countries], Warszawa: Urząd 
Antymonopolowy, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa 2005, p. 13. 
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actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from 
Community law, provided that such rules are not less favourable  
than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) 
and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively  
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle  
of effectiveness)”. 
 The Polish legislator has given up introducing any precise regulations 
concerning the problem of damages for the damage coming from  
the violation of Polish and EU competition law. Nonetheless, such claims 
may be pursued on general rules of tort liability. It leads to the situation  
in which there are no clear answers to fundamental questions connected 
with the rules of private enforcement of EU competition law. The problems 
of passing-of defence, access to evidence, and the standing of claimants  
in the Polish legal system are particularly unclear. There is also  
no established line of reasoning of the Polish courts in this area  
and as a consequence private enforcement of the EU competition law 
hardly plays any role in the Polish legal system, which does not seem  
to be in line with the EU standards. There are serious doubts as to whether 
Polish law does not “render practically impossible or excessively difficult 
the exercise of rights conferred by”33 European Union law.  
  
V.  FINAL REMARKS 
 
 The influence of the European standards upon Polish competition law 
has been very strong and has occurred in four areas: 
 theoretical approach, 
 content of legal regulations, 
 establishment of the place of competition law in the system  
of constitutional values, 
 case law. 
 Despite the somewhat specific character of Polish case law, the opinion 
that there are essential contradictions between it and the EU law  
                                                     
33 See Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025 paragraph 27; Case C-453/99 Courage  
and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 29. 
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is not justified. The sources of existing differences are of a historic  
and economic nature.  
 Nonetheless, the negligence of the Polish legislator leads  
to the generation of some tension between the EU and the Polish 
competition law. It is also hard to find any essential justification  
for not facilitating the possibility of claiming damages for the damage 
resulting from the violation of the EU competition law. Such legislative 
actions would improve the quality of the Polish competition  
law and remove the tension between it and the EU competition law.  
 
 
 
